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Abstract Can we trust robots? Responding to the litera-
ture on trust and e-trust, this paper asks if the question of
trust is applicable to robots, discusses different approaches
to trust, and analyses some preconditions for trust. In the
course of the paper a phenomenological-social approach to
trust is articulated, which provides a way of thinking about
trust that puts less emphasis on individual choice and
control than the contractarian-individualist approach. In
addition, the argument is made that while robots are neither
human nor mere tools, we have sufficient functional,
agency-based, appearance-based, social-relational, and
existential criteria left to evaluate trust in robots. It is also
argued that such evaluations must be sensitive to cultural
differences, which impact on how we interpret the criteria
and how we think of trust in robots. Finally, it is suggested
that when it comes to shaping conditions under which
humans can trust robots, fine-tuning human expectations
and robotic appearances is advisable.
Keywords Trust  Ethics  Robots  Social relations 
Phenomenology  Culture
Introduction
To frame the ethical question concerning robotics in terms
of trust may easily suggest science-fiction scenarios like
the story in the film ‘I, robot’ in which robots become
artificially intelligent to such an extent that humans wonder
if they can be trusted—which is usually interpreted as: Will
they rise up against us? But there is a broader and certainly
more urgent issue about trust in intelligent autonomous
technologies that are already available today or will be
available soon. Robotics for entertainment, sex, health
care, and military applications are fast developing fields of
research, autonomous cars are being developed, remote
controlled robots are used in medicine and in the military,
and we already heavily rely on semi-robots such as auto-
pilot-airplanes. And of course we (often heavily) rely on
computers and other information technology in our daily
lives. The more we rely on these technologies, the more
urgent becomes the issue of trust. As Taddeo writes in her
introduction to a special issue devoted to trust in
technology:
As the outsourcing to (informational) artefacts
becomes more pervasive, the trust and the depen-
dence of the users on such artefacts also grow,
bringing to the fore [issues] like the nature of trust,
the necessary requirements for its occurrence, whe-
ther trust can be developed toward an artefact or can
only concern human beings (…). (Taddeo 2010b,
p. 283)
In other words, we already delegate tasks to machines and
apparently we already trust them (I will return to this point
below). This seems also the case with robots. But do we
have good reasons to trust robots?1 Do we need to develop
what Wallach and Allen call ‘moral machines’ (Wallach
and Allen 2008) in order to make robots trustworthy and
avoid misuse of our trust? Does that mean we have to
develop rational artificial agents? Is it appropriate at all to
talk about trust here?
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In this paper, I postpone a direct analysis of the conditions
under which we can trust robots. Rather, I discuss what
trust means in relation to robots. First I provide a more
general, brief analysis of trust: I discuss different approa-
ches to analysing the conditions of trust (worthiness) in
relation to artefacts and to people in general. This gives me
some preconditions for trust. In the process I also comment
on (other) discussions of trust in the literature on trust and
e-trust. Then I explore if we can apply these preconditions
to robots and how different approaches shed light on this
question. I argue that in so far as robots appear human,
trusting them requires that they fulfil demanding criteria
concerning the appearance of language use, freedom, and
social relations. This kind of virtual trust develops in sci-
ence-fiction scenarios and can even become a question of
‘mutual’ trust. However, I also show that even if robots do
not appear human and/or do not fulfil these criteria, as is
the case today, we have sufficient functional, agency-
based, social-relational, and existential criteria left to talk
about, and evaluate, trust in robots. Finally, I argue that all
criteria depend to some degree on the culture in which one
lives and that therefore to evaluate trust in robots we have
to attend to, and understand, differences in cultural attitude
towards technology (and robots in particular) and, more
generally, cultural differences in ways of seeing and ways
of doing.
By proceeding in this way, I hope not only to contribute
to the normative-ethical discussion about trust in robots,
but also to discussions about how to approach information
ethics and ethics of robotics.
Trusting artefacts
Although the notion of trust is usually applied to human–
human relations, we sometimes say of an artefact that we
(do not) trust it. What we mean then is that we expect the
artefact to function, that is, to do what it is meant to do as
an instrument to attain goals set by humans. Although we
do not have full epistemic certainty that the instrument will
actually function, we expect it do so. For example, one may
trust a cleaning robot to do what it’s supposed to do—
cleaning. This kind of trust is what sometimes is called
‘trust as reliance’.
Related to this type of direct trust in artefacts is indirect
trust in the humans related to the technology: we trust that the
designer has done a good job to avoid bad outcomes and—if
we are not ourselves the users—we trust that the users will
make good use of it, that is, that they will use the artefact for
morally justifiable purposes. For example, military use of
robots and artificially intelligent systems may be controversial
because the (human) aims may be controversial (military
action in general or particular uses, actions and targets).
But does this mean that trusting artefacts is only about
reliance? Or does it mean that, as Pitt argues (Pitt 2010),
the question about trust in technology comes down to
trusting people (to do this or that)?2
Trusting people
In relation to people, the question of trust is different and
more complicated than reliance. Trust is generally regarded
as something that develops within (or establishes) a rela-
tion between humans (usually called a trustor and a trus-
tee) that has ethical aspects (or creates an ethical
dimension).
Trust
Before I discuss the relation between trust and ethics, let
me first say something about trust and how it is usually
approached, which influences the interpretation of the
definition just given.
I propose that we distinguish between a contractarian-
individualist and a phenomenological-social approach to
trust and its relation to ethics. In the former approach, there
are ‘first’ individuals who ‘then’ create a social relation (in
particular social expectations) and hence trust between
them. In the latter approach, the social or the community is
prior to the individual, which means that when we talk
about trust in the context of a given relation between
humans, it is presupposed rather than created. Here trust
cannot be captured in a formula and is something given,
not entirely within anyone’s control.
I take most standard accounts of trust to belong to the
contractarian-individualist category. For example, in phi-
losophy of information technology Taddeo’s overview of
the debate on trust and e-trust, and indeed her own work on
e-trust, is formulated within a contractarian-individualist
framework (Taddeo 2009, 2010a, b).
In her overview (Taddeo 2009) she discusses Luhmann
(1979) and Gambetta (1988). Luhmann’s analysis starts
from the problem of co-ordination. Trust is seen as a
response to that problem: it is needed to reduce complexity
and uncertainty. Thus, the analysis starts from individuals
and then it is questioned how the social can come into
existence (if at all). Similarly, when Gambetta defines trust
as ‘a particular level of the subjective probability with
which an agent assesses that another agent or group of
agents will perform a particular action’ (Gambetta 1988,
p. 216), we find ourselves in a kind of game-theoretical
2 In a later section of this paper, I will question these instrumentalist




setting typical of contractarian views of the social. Whether
or not to trust someone else is a matter of decision and
choice. The agent calculates (at least in Gambetta’s view)
and cooperative relations are the result of these choices and
calculations.
Taddeo’s account of e-trust differs from these views but
does not question the contractarian-individualist paradigm
itself. E-trust may arise between agents under certain
conditions (Taddeo 2009; see also Turili et al. 2010 and
Nissenbaum 2001), but the starting point of the analysis
remains individual agents, who take a risk when they trust
someone else, form beliefs about the other agent(s) before
they decide to trust, assesses the other’s trustworthiness,
etc. The starting point is the (Kantian regulative ideal of
the) ‘rational agent, able to choose the best option for itself,
given a specific scenario and a goal to achieve’ (Taddeo
2010a, p. 244). What matters is individual advantage and
achievement of the individual goal, and then an ‘objective
assessment’ is made in order to decide whether or not to
enter into the relation.3 Taddeo’s view belongs to what Ess
calls ‘cognitive’ or ‘rational’ accounts of trust: trust is the
product of a rational process; ‘we have reasons that justify
our trusting others’ (Ess 2010, pp. 289–290). While she
acknowledges that less rational agents may follow differ-
ent, more emotional criteria and that the criteria must be
specified case by case (Taddeo 2010a, p. 254), her main
analysis takes place at a higher level of abstraction and
remains centred around the goals agents want to achieve,
the choices they make, and the gains and costs their choices
incur.
Weckert’s view (2005) is different since it puts less
emphasis on calculation and rational evaluation of beliefs
and risks: he has criticized rational accounts for neglecting
experiences of trust such as those of children in relation to
their parents and those of friends. He has argued that we
have the tendency to see other agents as if they were
trustworthy and hence choose to act as if we trust and
postpone evaluation. But regardless of (other) problems
with his more ‘affective’ view (Ess 2010, p. 291), it stays
within the lines of the contractarian-individualist approach:
it is concerned with the agent’s attitude and a similar
contractarian evaluation is made—only afterwards.
The social-phenomenological view I attempt to articu-
late here, by contrast, defines trust not as something that
needs to be ‘produced’ but that is already there, in the
social. It is close to Myskja’s phenomenological view
(2008), which is based on a development of the pragmatic
rather than the rational dimension of Kant’s philosophy,
and which locates trust in the centre of our embodied and
social human condition. But is this still about ethics? Is this
still about trust?
This leads me to the question: How do the different
approaches conceptualize the relation between trust and
ethics?
Trust and ethics
In the contractarian-individualist approach, responsibility
is the flip side of trust. When we say that we trust someone,
we also ascribe responsibility to that person: the person
must be answerable to us for what he or she does. For
example, if someone asks me to keep an eye on her bag and
I walk away, I must answer to that person why I did not do
what she expected. Thus, trust ascription creates a deontic
field: if someone trusts me, I feel under an obligation not to
misuse that trust. The person relies on me. The expectation
becomes normative (as opposed to merely predictive, as in
the case of artefacts—although indirect trust also involves
normative expectations since then we deal with people). In
response to the expectation, I may make a promise Whe-
ther or not I explicitly communicate this promise,4 trust-
giving and trust-receiving involves the employment of a
kind of ‘moral language’ (I say I trust someone, I make
promises, I communicate my expectations, etc.,) which
creates the trust relation and its deontic implications.5
In the phenomenological-social approach, by contrast,
responsibility is already built-in in the social, communi-
tarian relation, which crucially has non-verbal and implicit
aspects. Here morality is not something that is created but
that is already embedded in the social. There are moral-
social relations. There is a kind of basic confidence, in
which reliance and reasoning are rooted and which they
must presuppose.6
3 Note that Taddeo also expands this rationalist and individualist
view to artificial agents, see for instance Taddeo (2010a, p. 248); I
will comment on ‘artificial agents’ below.
4 Note, however, that even if there is no explicit communication
about expectations and trust, this account presupposes that both
parties are aware of the trust relation. If the trustee is not aware of
being trusted, then it seems to me that the trustee is under no
obligation and no deontic field is created. To use an example: if I were
to ‘trust’ my neighbor to switch on his radio every morning in order
for me to wake up (without him knowing that I ‘trust’ him in this
way), this creates no obligation on the part of my neighbor. Perhaps
this is more about expectations (alone) than about trust between
people. In the same sense of ‘trust’ I may expect the sun to rise
tomorrow morning. But no deontic field is created.
5 My articulation of the contractarian-individualist view of the
relation between trust and ethics is inspired by Searle’s social
ontology (Searle 1995 and subsequent developments of this theory).
6 Note that these relations are also felt: feelings of friendship, love,
etc. accompany the trust relation: among other things they make
possible trust and—looking at it from a contractarian-individualist
point of view—such feelings may be created and intensified by the
construction of trust.
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Preconditions for trust
Several conditions for trust (or, more precise, trustworthi-
ness) have been discussed in the literature on trust and
e-trust, such as direct interactions and shared values (see
for example Taddeo 2009). But I wish to make a different
kind of claim. The previous discussion of trust in human–
human relations gives us at least three conditions we must
presuppose about persons that might trust one another,
regardless of (other) conditions under which they are jus-
tified to trust each other:
1. Ability to use language, in particular the moral
language of giving trust, promise making, expressing
expectations etc. In the contractarian-constructivist
view of trust, this is absolutely necessary in order to
establish trust. But accounts of trustworthiness ‘assess-
ment’ based on calculation miss this moral-linguistic
dimension. A social-phenomenological account, by
contrast, has the conceptual resources to point to both
linguistic and non-linguistic preconditions of trust.
Talking about trust presupposes a subject-talker, who
does not talk and act as an abstract ‘rational agent’ but
as an embodied and social being.
2. Freedom and uncertainty: the giver of trust (the trustor)
must be free, since the trustor cannot be forced to trust
someone. A true gift cannot be forced. Moreover, the
receiver of trust (trustee) must be free, since we must
suppose that the receiver has the possibility to misuse
the given trust—if there is absolute certainty about what
will happen then there is no point in trusting someone.
This means that there has to be freedom in the sense of
proper delegation and no (direct) supervision. As Turilli
et al. write when summarizing Taddeo’s view: ‘The
trustor does not supervise the trustee’s behaviour (…).
Delegation and absence of supervision are then the
defining characteristics of the occurrence of trust.’
(Turili et al. 2010, p. 340). In the contractarian-
constructivist view, individual freedom is crucial. The
social-phenomenological view, however, can point out
that the game of giving and receiving trust is already
part of a social context in which trust is less under the
control of individuals than assumed by the individualist
view, and is more an emergent and/or embedded
property. This also allows us to take a different
perspective on the uncertainty related to trust: it is not
so much that I am uncertain about whether or not I (as a
rational agent) will reach my goal by delegating a
particular task to someone else; rather, if there is a
problem of trust I am uncertain about the social relation
itself. When trust is an issue, the social relation, and
therefore I, am at stake as a vulnerable and embodied
social being.
3. Social relations. From a contractarian-individualist
point of view, social relations are constructed or
produced by individuals and any concept or institution
that is related to the social, such as trust, also has this
status: it is a construction or product. From a
phenomenological-social point of view, trust-talk and
talk about individual freedom presupposes social
relations (and embodiment). In other words, there is
trust because there are already social relations. Trust is
something basic that must be presupposed; it is not
created but emerges from social relations.7 Therefore,
we must presuppose of persons that might trust one
another that there is already a social relation, which the
persons experience as embodied and vulnerable beings
that stand-in-relation.
I take the latter perspective to be in line with the
phenomenological and virtue ethics views of trust summa-
rized by Ess, which pay more attention to embodied,
affective and social dimensions of trust as opposed to the
rational and the individual dimensions (Ess 2010).
Can the two approaches be reconciled?
One may object now that I over-emphasize the differences
between the two approaches. Contractarian-individualism,
or at least one version of it, could respond to the phe-
nomenological social challenge by claiming that both
approaches are not far apart since they could agree that
trust is the ‘default’; only when there is a problem we
switch to trust assessment. This objection rests on a par-
ticular version of the contractarian-individualist approach:
the thesis is changed from ‘One trusts only when there is a
good reason to’ to the different, modified thesis: ‘One trusts
unless there is a good reason not to trust’. If this modifi-
cation is made, then it seems that the gap between the two
approaches is not as wide as I suggest, since it seems that
both approaches could agree that we trust by default and
that in the default mode no thought is given to trusting.
However, I believe the two approaches still differ in how
they describe this default trust and in how they understand
mistrust.
For contractarian-individualists, default trust is a matter
of individual attitude or stance, whereas the phenomeno-
logical-social approach understands trust as something that
7 One may object that there can be trust without social relations: I
may trust myself. (e.g. to do something) However, self-trust is at least
a special case of trust, if it is about trust at all. Perhaps self-trust
depends on the kind of relation I have with myself, which is ‘social’
in the sense that it supposes that I talk with myself as if there are two
persons having a conversation. By itself, talking with yourself is a
form of thinking and is very common. But saying that you trust
yourself remains a philosophically (and probably also psychologi-
cally) problematic use of the word ‘trust’.
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arises or emerges from the social relations in which we find
ourselves. The very term ‘default’ still belongs to the
contractarian-individualist vocabulary since it presupposes
that there is always a choice situation. As in electronics and
computing, ‘default’ refers to a pre-selected option that is
followed except when changed. Used as a metaphor by
contractarian-individualists, it means that the social ‘sys-
tem’ may well pre-select the option ‘trust’ but that we
individuals can change this if there is a good reason to do
so (the thesis is that ‘one trusts unless there is a good
reason not to trust’), which implies that we can always
assess and re-assess, and then adapt our relation to others.
But this presupposes that we have always a choice with
regard to social relations and their form(ation). And if we
are aware of this, then the seed of mistrust has already been
planted. The phenomenological-social approach, by con-
trast, attends us to the possibility that we do not always and
perhaps not usually have full control over giving trust or
not giving trust (and indeed over our social relations and
their form). Sometimes we trust in spite of good reasons
not to trust, or sometimes we mistrust in spite of good
reasons to trust. The phenomenological-social approach
concedes that sometimes we live in the mode of ‘trust
assessment’, but it stresses that the contractarian-indivi-
dualist thesis ‘One trusts unless there is good reason not to
trust’ describes only one way of shaping our social rela-
tions, one possibility of how we can look at human rela-
tions. Of course the new formula is already more ‘trustful’
than the initial ‘One trusts only when there is a good reason
to’, but still gives the last word to human reasoning. The
phenomenological-social approach accounts for the expe-
rience that sometimes we are drawn into trust or mistrust,
that sometimes—and perhaps more often than we like—we
cannot help (mis) trusting.
In any case, we now have an overview of different
approaches to human trust and we have some preconditions
for trust in humans. But what about trust in robots?
Trusting robots
In so far as robots can be considered as ‘mere’ artefacts,
our trust in them must be based on functional criteria. If
they are means to an end, then whether or not they attain
the end (success or no success or a certain degree of suc-
cess) must be the criterion for trust. But is this all that can
be said about trust between humans and robots? It seems
that robots are ‘more’ than mere tools.
I believe that there are at least two ways to go beyond
the instrumentalist view of robots, the approach of which
roughly fall within the categories I called ‘contractarian-
individualist’ and ‘phenomenological-social’.
First, within the (individualist) analytical tradition, one
may discuss trust between humans and robots in terms of
trust between human agents and ‘artificial agents’. Taddeo
has even discussed trust between artificial agents. In the
latter case, the human-style preconditions such as freedom
and language do not seem relevant; rather, non-anthropo-
centric criteria such as (operational) autonomy and inter-
activity are proposed (Taddeo mentions for example the
criteria for artificial agency proposed by Floridi and
Sanders 2004). Taddeo has argued that trust-based inter-
actions are possible ‘even when social and moral norms are
not present’ (Taddeo 2009, p. 19). Thus, here the ‘problem’
is solved by conceptualizing both humans and robots as
agents. Considering both the human and the robot as an
agent, that is, an ‘it’ (Taddeo 2010a, p. 244), this approach
allows one to employ the contractarian-individualist
apparatus across the human-robot distinction.
Second, contemporary philosophy of technology in the
phenomenological tradition has shown in a different way
that the instrumentalist view of technology is inadequate.
For example, influenced by (mainly) Heideggerian phe-
nomenology, the insight has emerged that technological
artefacts ‘do’ more than is intended by humans: they co-
shape how we understand and act in the world (Ihde 1990;
Verbeek 2005). Hence, robots do not just do what they are
made for and their meaning is what Ihde calls ‘multistable’:
we might see them as machines but also as more than
machines. In particular, we might treat them as if they were
animals or as if they are (human) persons—a type of entity
we can relate to as social beings. In the latter case, they
become ‘quasi-others’.
In recent work I have argued that from a phenomenological
point of view, robots may appear as more than machines and
that this has consequences for ethics of robotics: a relational,
social, and phenomenological approach helps us to better
understand human-robot relations and the ethical problems
they raise (Coeckelbergh 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c,
2010d). Thus, here the question is not whether or not robots
are agents (individual-ontological approach) but how they
appear and how that appearance is shaped by, and shapes, the
social (social-relational approach). Appearance-making,
sometimes named ‘deception’, then is part of ‘the social
game’ (see also Myskja 2008, p. 217) and it does not under-
mine trust but supports it.
For trust in robots, the latter approach implies that
although robots are not human and do not meet the two
constructivist-individualist preconditions for trust in
human–human relations (ability to use language and free-
dom), they may nevertheless contribute to the establish-
ment of ‘virtual trust’ or ‘quasi-trust’ in so far that they
appear as quasi-others or social others, as language users,
and as free agents. We trust robots if they appear trust-
worthy and they appear trustworthy if they are good
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players in the social game.8 (This might even create the
feeling of ‘mutual’ trust on the part of the human.)
One may object that such robots are still science-fiction.
However, one should not underestimate the potential impli-
cations of progress in the field of social robotics and the
capacity for humans to anthropomorphize. No perfect ‘copy’
of the human is necessary to trigger quasi-social responses.
But let us suppose for the sake of argument that this reply is
unsatisfactory and that we cannot possibly build robots that
appear to meet the mentioned preconditions for trust in
human–human relations. Can we still trust (current) robots?
How can we evaluate existing robots in terms of trust?
First, we can still use the functionalist, performance
criterion: can the robot do what it is supposed—that is,
expected—to do? Is it a means to the end set by us?
Second, we may consider the robot as an ‘artificial
agent’ and apply Taddeo’s conceptual framework to dis-
cuss trust between humans and robots-as-artificial agents.
Third, whether or not the robot and the human-robot
relation meet the constructivist-individualist criteria or the
criteria for artificial (moral) agency, they may fulfil the
following phenomenological-social requirement: if a
human-robot relation grows as a social relation, then trust
is already there as a ‘default’ in the social relation—albeit
in an implicit, affective way—regardless of how people
construct the relation (e.g. as human–machine interaction)
and how they talk about the robot and about themselves
(e.g. as individuals). In contrast to my description of ‘vir-
tual trust’, there is no requirement here that the robot
appears as a quasi-other; the emphasis is not so much on
perception but on the relational bond, which is more ‘felt’
and experienced than seen or ac-knowledged. Most of the
time, no deliberation is needed about who or what to trust.
We live with technology and with others; we are engaged
in social-technological activity.
Third, robots can and should also be evaluated not only in
terms of what they do in the world in relation to the goal set
(functionalist, performance criterion) or in terms of how they
shape the human-robot relation (social criterion) but also in
terms of how they help us to understand and shape ourselves.
For example, I have argued in other conference contributions
that robots are hermeneutical tools that help us to understand
ourselves. And recently Kiran and Verbeek have argued that
technology puts at stake what it is to be a human being:
humans and technologies have an ‘intimate’ and ‘internal’
relation and as we trust ourselves to technology we shape our
existence. Rather than reliance, trust then takes on the char-
acter of confidence (Kiran and Verbeek 2010).9
Thus, from a social-phenomenological (and from an exis-
tential-phenomenological) perspective I conclude that we
already trust ourselves to technologies and depend on them.
The individualist-constructivist approach (and to some extent
the existentialist-individualist approach) presupposes that
there is first the human individual, who asks himself the
question if he or she will use the technology and trust it. But
our lives are already interwoven with technologies. They are
not just tools we use to attain our goals (including goals
concerning self-care or self-constitution); they are part of the
social and existential fabric, from which we emerge as indi-
viduals and selves in the first place. In this sense, evaluating
whether or not we can trust robots means to evaluate the social
and ourselves as social beings.
Cultural differences
This analysis of preconditions for trust and their application to
human-robot relations need not be interpreted in an entirely
universalist way. The application of all criteria for trusting
robots (and, more generally, technology) proposed here
depends to a significant degree on the culture in which one
lives. Consider again the criteria, from which I derive the
following hypotheses concerning the role of cultural differ-
ence in trusting robots:
1. Functionality/performance: in so far as cultures differ
with respect to their ends (values) and with respect to
the ways they see fit to reach those ends (using
technology or not, how technology is used, for which
end), whether or not a person has reasons to trust a
robot, depends on the culture he or she lives in. For
example, in some parts of the world using robots in
8 By ‘social game’ I mean to emphasize that social relations should
not be considered as a ‘state’ but as an ongoing process, which has its
own rules and dynamics (and contractarian game theory is only one
possible way of describing this process). I also hint at Myskja’s use of
the term in his discussion of Kant’s argument that pretending to be
better than we are, actually makes us better: pretending is acceptable
as part of the ‘social game’ and therefore even required. Thus, playing
the ‘social game’ (for robots and for humans) means producing the
right kind of appearance and pretending that you are better than you
are. Note that next to this ‘moral’ deception the robot also has to
perform an ‘ontological’ deception in the sense that it has to pretend
to be an entity that it is not. Note also that not only (humanoid or
social) robots can appear in a personal and social way. For example,
some people talk to their navigation device in their car. People also
talk to computers and other things. Whether or not something appears
as quasi-other is a matter of degree, and robots that resemble humans
seem to promote a high degree of what Ihde calls an ‘alterity’
experience: the technology is not perceived as a tool, as something in
the background, or as something that has become part of ourselves
(e.g. glasses), but as an other.
9 Note, however, that by emphasizing the intimate relation between
technology and individual subjectivity as self-constitution and self-
care, Kiran and Verbeek do not pay much attention to the social
aspect of trust. Moreover, they suggest that trusting ourselves to
technology—developing a ‘free’ relation to technology—requires a




elderly care may be seen as less problematic than in
other parts of the world.
2. The term ‘agent’ (and hence ‘artificial agent’ and the
type of analysis that can be conducted in the wake of
this term) may be less intelligible in societies that have
a less individualistic culture than ours. Hence refer-
ences to criteria for agency, the emphasis on rational
agency, etc. may be problematic in some cultures.
3. Language use: whether or not a robot appears to use
moral language depends on whether or not the robot
can imitate the moral language of a particular culture.
Cultures differ with respect to the way they express
expectations, promises, etc. related to trust.
4. Freedom: if a culture places more value on individual
freedom, it will be more difficult for a robot to produce the
appearance of freedom and hence to meet this condition.
5. Social relations: cultures differ in the extent and the
way the embed robots into the social fabric. If robots
are already perceived and lived as part of society and
culture, one can expect a higher degree of trust in
robots.
6. Human-technological existence: if a culture puts less
emphasis on the subject-object distinction or even
rejects such a distinction, we can expect that trust in
robots will be higher.
These hypotheses could guide empirical research but can
also be used for the purpose of further philosophical
reflection on, and understanding of, what trusting robots
means. Furthermore, apart from pointing us to differences
in interpretation and application of trust criteria with regard
to human-robot relations, attention to cultural differences
has also the philosophical merit of re-opening the discus-
sion about overall approaches to trust. To what extent can
we ‘choose’ between the contractarian-individualist and
the phenomenological-social approach, given (and assum-
ing) that the first is more prominent in the West? If we take
a phenomenological-social approach, the meta-discussion
about approaches is not seen as being isolated from cultural
context. The way we think about trust, even at this more
abstract level, also depends on the culture we live in. The
cultural context of this inquiry is both enabling and
limiting. The contractarian-individualist approach gives us
powerful conceptual tools; perhaps it is difficult to fully
explore and articulate a more social approach to trust in a
social-cultural environment that is impregnated with a
different way of seeing and doing.
Conclusion
Based on a brief, preliminary analysis of what it means to
trust artefacts and to trust people, I analysed two opposing
approaches to trust(worthiness) and suggested some pre-
conditions for trusting robots. Since some of the criteria
were based on human–human relations, they first seemed
not applicable to human-robot relations, but I have dis-
cussed two solutions for this problem, based on (1) a
contractarian-individualist approach focused on agency and
(2) a phenomenological and social approach. I have mainly
supported the latter approach, which often receives little
consideration in information ethics and ethics of robotics.
What remains is the insight that if we wish to fully
understand what it takes for us to trust robots, we should
not take for granted the instrumental view of human-
technology relations and the individualist-constructivist
view of trust and social relations. Thus, trusting technology
need not only concern the human attempt to be in control
and in power, as Luhmann suggested (1979) and as con-
tractarian-individualist echo when they define trust in terms
of a decision. Adaptation to environments (e.g., techno-
social environments) does not necessarily require the
exercise of agency. Often we cannot help trusting tech-
nology and trusting others, and luckily we often do so
without having a reason and without calculation (not even
afterwards). In so far as robots are already part of the social
and part of us, we trust them as we are already related to
them. And if they are new, then we trust them as we are
beginning to relate to them. As we are learning and as we
are developing skills for dealing with these new entities,
trust grows. In this sense, trusting robots is not science-
fiction but is already happening, and rational calculation is
only one interpretation of, and way of how one’s relation to
the technology takes shape. (I do not deny, of course, that
rational assessment of one’s relations is possible; however,
it is important to see that it is only one way of seeing and
doing, which presupposes a more basic social-moral
ground.)
Moreover, I should be careful with using the ‘we’ here. I
have highlighted how the application of any of these cri-
teria is dependent on culture. This does not imply that we
should refrain from attempting to offer general ethical
guidelines when it comes to trusting robots and ethics of
robotics—the discussion in this essay could be viewed as
an exploration of what kind of framework could possibly
justify such guidelines—but rather that when we have such
general principles or criteria, they should not be understood
as standing outside the cultural-hermeneutical process;
they will always require interpretation as we move on. The
same is true for the approaches to trust presented here.
To conclude, in this discussion I have mainly discussed
the question if it is appropriate at all to talk about trusting
robots, which has allowed me to distinguish between dif-
ferent approaches to trust and which has given me some
preconditions for trust. I have also indicated the relevance
of cultural differences for answering the question regarding
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trust in robots. However, I have not provided a more
straightforward discussion of the question under what
conditions we can trust robots (the answer to which must
be informed by one of the approaches). Such an inquiry
might for example involve the question if ‘affective’ robots
are deceptive—a question I discussed elsewhere. But
whether or not affective robots are deceptive, one condition
for trust seems to concern fine-tuning human expectations
about robots, perhaps by fine-tuning robotic appearances.
Picard, who initiated the term and field of ‘affective
computing’ (Picard 1995, 1997, 2003), writes in her book
the following, which seems applicable to ‘affective’ robots:
A danger with personified characters (…) is that
people may consequently expect human-like intelli-
gence, understanding, and actions from them. In
some cases, a machine may need to explain what it
can and cannot do. In any case, it will be important to
help people accurately set expectations of the com-
puter’s abilities. (Picard 1997, p. 114)
As this quote suggests, perhaps there is also a sense in
which we may put too much trust in some kinds of robots—
especially if there is a kind of basic trust and confidence
that permeates social relations and if this kind of trust is
carried over to human-robot relations. More should be said
about robotic emotions, appearance, and (conditions for)
trust. But here I pause my reflections on the question
regarding (the evaluation of) trust in robots and how we
can approach this question.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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